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DICTA

AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK OF DENVER V.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF DENVER AND
HEREFORD STATE BANK*
By ARNOLD M. CHUTKOW, Member of Colorado BDar
Intructor of Lau, University of Denver College of Lai.

The Plaintiff, American National Bank of Denver, brought
an action against Defendant, The Hereford State Bank, the first
endorsee on the check in question, and Defendant, First National
Bank of Denver, the intermediate endorsee which presented the
check to the drawee-Plaintiff. The action arose when a depositor
to the Plaintiff issued a check payable to two payees. When presented to Defendant Hereford, it bore the endorsement of only
one of the payees. Thereafter, Hereford endorsed "Pay to the
order of any bank, banker or Trust Company. Prior endorsements
guaranteed," and transferred it to a bank in Cheyenne, Wyoming,
not a party to the action, which endorsed to the Defendant, First
National. The latter then presented the check for payment to the
Plaintiff which paid the same and charged the account to its
depositor. The drawee objected to the charge because of the missing endorsement and the bank reimbursed the account. The Plaintiff then began the action to recover the amount paid on the check.
The Complaint was based on two theories: that of the Negotiable Instruments Law,1 and upon the allegation that payment
to the Defendants was made "without consideration and paid by
it to them by mistake." The Trial Court dismissed both claims
against both Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed as to the
First National Bank, but reversed with respect to the second claim
as to Hereford.
The Plaintiff relied upon the case of Interstate Trust Company v. United States National Bank, 2 to support a reversal of
the dismissal of the First Claim with respect to both Defendants.
The Court refused to base its decision upon the rather broad language of this decision which involved an altered check and was
extremely cautious in its approach to the Interstate decision. The
The Court went to great lengths to distinguish the case by stating
that the following language was dictum:
The drawee bank need concern itself with nothing
but the genuineness of the signature, and the state of
the account with it of the drawee.
Generally, it may be stated that a drawee bank must concern
itself with its depositors' accounts and must know their signatures. 3 It is axiomatic that the drawee may not debit the account
* _..... Colo ....... 277 P. (2d) 951.
'Colorado Revised Statutes (1953), Chapter 95.
'67 Colo. 6, 185 P. 260, 10 A.L.R. 705.
3 Such a proposition is elementary and would appear to need no citation of
authority. There may be an exception to the general rule which would occur
when the depositor, by his course of conduct, negligence or laches has created a
condition amounting to estoppel. See Denbigh v. First National Bank of Seattle,
102 Wash. 546, 174 P. 475.

DICTA

May-June, 1955

of a depositor where a check has been forged or materially altered, 4 because the former may act only in accordance with the
order or direction placed on the instrument by the latter. The
Supreme Court, understandably, hesitated to extend the dictum
of the Interstate case so as to hold that the only matters which
must concern the drawee are those discussed above.
The action was not, however, one by the depositor against
the drawee because of a debit of an account. Rather, it was an
action to recover money remitted on this check to the Defendants.
Not only did Justice Alter refuse to rely upon the Interstate
Trust case, but he would not base his decision upon the Negotiable
Instruments Law. The decision held that since the check was not
negotiated as defined by the Negotiable Instruments Law, the
check in question ceased to be negotiable; since it was not negotiable, the rights and liabilities arising from the same could not be
governed by the Negotiable Instruments Law. Although there is
support for such reasoning it would appear more logical to reason
that as long as the check complied with the requirements of the
Negotiable Instruments Law as to the negotiable characteristics,
the instrument was negotiable. However, because it was not "negotiated," the rights and liabilities must arise independently of
the N.I.L. which sets forth the obligations arising out of negotiation.6
The refusal of the Court to rule on the basis of the N.I.L.
adds nothing to clarity. Cases arising out of situations where recovery is sought where money has been paid out in forged or
altered instruments and forged endorsements, are not based primarily upon the N.I.L7 The problems have been treated as those
encompassed within the fields of negligence and quasi contract
generally, and the law of mistake specifically.
It is generally recognized that money paid out under mutual
mistake of fact, may be recovered. 8 This principal was not extended, however, to negotiable instruments on which the signature
4 With respect to the altered check, there is authority substantiating the
position that the drawee may charge the account for the amount of the check
prior to alteration, if the alteration consisted of raising the instrument. National Bank of Commerce of New York v. National Mechanic's Banking Association of New York, 55 N.Y. 211, 14 Am. Rep. 232.

5 Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953), Ch. 95, Art. 1, Secs. 1-9.
6Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953), Ch. 95, Art. 1, Secs. 63-69. If one of the payees
failed to endorse, the instrument could not be negotiated as defined by the
N.I.L. (Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953), Ch. 95, Art. 1, Sec. 30). If the instrument was
not negotiated, and there was any transfer, the legal ramifications of the same
cannot arise by virtue of the N.I.L.
7Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354; Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany (N.Y.), I Hill
28?; First National Bank of Minneapoli s v. First City National Bank, 182 Mass.
130, 65 N.E. 24; Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Fifth-Third Union Trust Co., 56
Ohio App. 309, 10 N.E. (2d) 935; See also Ames, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal,

4 Harv. L. Rev. 257, 301-302.
1 "The right to recover is a quasi-contractual right resting upon the doctrine
that one who confers a benefit in mis-reliance upon a right or duty is entitled
to restitution." Woodward, Quasi Contracts, (1913) Sec. 80.
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of the drawee had been forged, where a drawee sought to recover.!'
This rule, known as the rule of Price v. Neal 10 is thought to prevail by virtue of the law merchant independent of the Negotiable
Instruments Law and also by virtue of Section 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Law." When Price v. Neal was decided, the
grounds for this exception to the principle of mutual mistake were
not stated without ambiguity. It is difficult to determine whether
the rationale was that of imposing absolute knowledge in the
drawee of its depositor's signature thus rendering him negligent,
or whether it is that of "yet there is no reason to throw off the
loss from one innocent man to another innocent man."
Where it is the endorsement that is forged and not the sig2
nature of the drawee, the rule of Price v. Neal is said not to apply.'
Barring other factors, a drawee bank is permitted to recover
money paid out by it on a forged endorsement. Although there
has been considerable doubt, recovery also is permitted where
money is paid in a materially altered check. 13 The Interstate Trust
case, the Court refused to apply to the missing endorsement situation, supports recovery on an altered instrument. Recovery is
rationalized in these situations by the fact that it seems harsh to
charge a bank with knowledge of the signature of prior endorsers,
or with the original terms of the instrument. 14 If anyone is to be
charged, it should be he who had the greatest opportunity to determine the validity of the endorsement.1
In the present case, the Court refused to apply the Negotiable Instruments Law. The basis for the discussion is nevertheless problematical. Initially Justice Alter seemed to base the
opinion upon the negligence of the Defendant, Hereford, which
resulted in the mistake of the drawee bank. Such a theory would
not appear to be sound, for the drawee was equally at fault because the missing endorsement was patently apparent. If negligence were the basis then it could be said that the contributory
negligence of the drawee should bar recovery. Apparently realizing this, emphasis was also placed upon contractual recovery
IPrice v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354.
10 Footnote 9 supra.

"Colo.
(1943)

Rev. Stat., (1953) Ch. 95, Art. 1, Sec. 62; Britton, Bills and Notes,

Sec. 135.

1"State Planters Bank and Trust Co. v. Fifth-third Union Trust Co., op. cit.
sitpra, note 7. The N.I.L. does not expressly deal with the problem, but the
generally accepted common law rule is deemed to have been imported by virtue
of Section 196 (Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953), Ch. 95, Art. 4, Sec. 7). For a collection
of cases see Britton, Bills and Notes (1943), Sec. 139, Fn. 2.
" See Interstate Trust Co. v. United States National Bank, 67 Colo. 61, 185
P. 260. Rule 62 of the N.I.L was not discussed in this case. See National City
Bank of Chicago v. National Bank of Republic, 300 Ill. 163, 132 N.E. 832, and
Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 156, 4 P.

(2d)

781, which discuss the effect of Sec. 62 of the N.I.L. with-respect to checks certified after alteration.
14Eg. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 63 S. Ct. 573.
I Ibid.
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where contributory negligence has not ordinarily been considered
a defense:
If Hereford is liable ....
it must rest upon a contractual duty to return to plaintiff money which it has
recovered and holds under mistake.
The decision would, then, appear to be consistent with quasicontractual notions of recovery for mistake. However, the rationale
for permitting recovery in forgery cases is that the drawee cannot be expected to have knowledge of a forged endorsement. Where
one of two necessary endorsements is missing, a drawee may and
perhaps should be charged with knowledge. The fact of its omission is apparent by a cursory examination of the instrument. As
a matter of policy it could be argued that a bank must at least
be held accountable for all patent irregularities on the back or
face of a negotiable instrument.
The decision would have been more understandable had the
Court not affirmed the dismissals as to both claims so far as the
First National Bank was concerned; this unexplained affirmance
is confusing in light of the fact that the reasoning which resulted
in a reversal with respect to Hereford is equally applicable to
the other Defendant. Perhaps the Court felt Hereford to be more
at fault because it was the first endorsee on the check and accordingly should be more concerned with endorsements and endorsees
than subsequent parties. But, where contractual principles are
applied, comparative-rectitude would appear irrevelant.
The Court stated that the question was one of first impression
in Colorado. Perhaps the only conclusion that can be reached with
respect to the decision is that it fixes liability where an endorsement is missing; that the choice of the liable party was, in a
sense, by virtue of nature of the question presented, an arbitrary
choice. It would appear, perhaps, that the person or agency which
first takes a check with a missing endorsement will be held liable
regardless of the fact that all subsequent parties are guilty of
the same sin.
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problems which are of interest to every Colorado lawyer.. We are
aware that many of the problems which are of interest to you are
not covered in this journal. Every single lawyer in Colorado has
the opportunity to contribute to this journal. We are always happy
to receive an article or a comment by practicing attorneys.
We hope that in the future we -Wvill continue to receive your
writing, and in that manner further the purpose of DICTA in serving you as a Colorado lawyer.
Please address all writing or comments to Mr. Arnold M.
Chutkow, 750 Equitable Bldg., Denver, Colo., or to Mr. A. Robert
McMullen, University of Denver College of Law, Denver, Colo.

